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The American economy is just now recovering from its most difficult
period since the Great Depression. In the eight years following the 1973
oil embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), the average annual rate of growth in industrial production fell
by nearly sixty percent, while the rate of growth in labor productivity fell
by approximately seventy percent relative to the average rates of the pre-
ceding twenty five years.1 By 1980 the annual rate of inflation, as mea-
sured by the Consumer Price Index, had reached 13.5 percent, the highest
rate since 1947 and more than twice the rate in 1970;' and by 1982 the
rate of unemployment had reached 9.7 percent, the highest rate since 1941
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and nearly double the rate in 1970.3 In the six years following the OPEC
embargo the nation's view of its economic future changed from one of
seemingly boundless optimism to one of great concern. The new mood was
perhaps best captured by President Carter in his famous 1979 speech on
"malaise" in America."
Out of these experiences came the realization that new government pol-
icies might be necessary to revive the nation's industrial base and restore
the economy to its post-World War II trend of steady growth with mini-
mal inflation and low unemployment. Very few people dispute that gov-
ernment should play some role in promoting industrial and economic
growth; discussion today centers on the nature of government's role in
formulating and implementing industrial policy. Simply stated, should it
try more actively to guide and coordinate the decisions of business and
labor, or should it rely primarily on decentralized competitive forces?
Advocates of a more centralized approach argue that a host of market
imperfections badly distort the American economy.' In their view, indus-
trial policy is not a preference for central planning over some idealized
model of laissez-faire, but rather a means of making the best of an un-
avoidably imperfect marketplace. Given certain inevitable distortions, gov-
ernment, business, and labor should participate in a cooperative effort to
rationalize the distortions and bring order from chaos. Robert Reich,
whose writings have played a major part in stimulating and shaping de-
bate on industrial policy, has called for "a political forum capable of gen-
erating large-scale compromise and adaptation" which would "enable
government, business, and labor to fashion explicit agreements to restruc-
ture American industry."6 Such spokesmen often urge the U.S. govern-
3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1984, at 405 (104th ed. 1983).
4. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1979, at AIO, col. 1, 2 ("The symptoms of this crisis of the American
spirit are all around us.").
5. See, e.g., Kuttner, Commentary on Paul Krugman's "Targeted Industrial Policies: Theory and
Evidence," in INDUSTRIAL CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 169-76 (1983) (a symposium sponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City). "Microeconomically, we know that investors often strive
for short-run profit-maximization that often fails to serve long-run industrial well being ... " Id. at
169.
6. Reich, The Next American Frontier, ATL. MONTHLY, Apr. 1983, at 98, 107. See also R.
REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983); 1. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S
BUSINESS (1982); Eizenstat, Reindustrialization Through Government-Business-Labor Alliance, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (1984); Do Modern Times Call for an Industrial Policy? A Conversation with
Herbert Stein and Lester Thurow, PUBLIC OPINION, Aug.-Sept. 1983, at 2-9, 58-59; Kuttner, supra
note 5, at 169, 171, 176; Hearings on a US. Industrial Policy Before the Subcomm. on Economic
Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
340-41 (1983) (statement of Owen Bieber, President, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America). Other prominent supporters of some form of tripartite cooperation
and planning include AFL-CIO chairman Lane Kirkland, investment banker Felix Rohatyn, and
former DuPont chairman Irving S. Shapiro. Messrs. Kirkland, Rohatyn, and Shapiro have proposed
a National Industrial Policy Board consisting of leaders from business, government and labor under
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ment to emulate the allegedly more cooperative, tripartite microeconomic
policies of such growth-oriented nations as Japan.
Advocates of a more prominent role for decentralized market forces ac-
knowledge that the government has an important responsibility to pro-
mote economic growth through sound macroeconomic and microeconomic
policies. 7 They fear, however, that any comprehensive effort to coordinate
the decisions of private entrepreneurs and laborers would be dominated by
special interests and do more harm than good.' They believe that, despite
its imperfections, competition is the best coordinator of business, labor,
and consumer decisions-especially in a complex industrial economy.'
They question how successful West European and Far Eastern govern-
ments have been in fostering economic growth through programs empha-
sizing coordinated action.1 Finally, many advocates of the market-based
approach worry about the implications of a coordinated business, labor,
and government strategy for fairness, individual liberty, and the nation's
political institutions.
These opposing positions, however, are not polar extremes. Cooperative
or group action can sometimes coincide with intense competition. For ex-
ample, there is widespread agreement that research joint ventures among
otherwise independent firms can contribute to the nation's technological
progress." The nation's space exploration program illustrates how the
government can achieve discrete, well-defined objectives through a central-
ly-coordinated mix of competition and cooperation. The Alaska pipeline
provides an example of a highly successful joint venture of independent
the supervision of Congress. Various bills have been introduced to create tripartite coordination mech-
anisms. Congressman LaFalce, for example, has conducted extensive hearings in which he invited
testimony from a wide cross section of both proponents and opponents of such plans. See, e.g., HOUSE
COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., FORGING AN INDUS-
TRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY 61-73 (Comm. Print 1983).
7. Representative statements of this view include Schultze, Industrial Policy: A Solution in Search
of a Problem, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1983, at 4, 13 [hereinafter cited as A Solution in Search of
a Problem]; Schultze, Industrial Policy: A Dissent, 2 BROOKINGS REV. 3 , 11 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as A Dissent]; R. LAWRENCE, CAN AMERICA COMPETE? 112-15 (1984); Krugman, Targeted Indus-
trial Policies: Theory and Evidence, in INDUSTRIAL CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-55 (1983).
8. See A Dissent, supra note 7, at 9-10; Eads, Commentary on Paul Krugman's "Targeted In-
dustrial Policies: Theory and Evidence," in INDUSTRIAL CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 157-67 (1983).
9. See, e.g., A Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 7, at I 1, 15; A Dissent, supra note 7,
at 12.
10. See, e.g., A Dissent, supra note 7, at 6-7.
11. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY AND INNOVA-
TION ACT (S. 1841), S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-4 (1984); HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, JOINT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1984 (H.R. 5041), H.R. REP. NO. 656,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH AND DEVEL-
OPMENT JOINT VENTURE ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 571, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 8-11 (1983).
See also J. Miller III, Research Joint Ventures, Antitrust, and Industrial Innovation, Address before
the Berlin Cartel Conference (July 2, 1984).
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corporations.' But each such program has been justified as a special ex-
ception in which substantial benefits existed beyond those which could
have been captured through ordinary marketplace competition. From the
time the country was founded, the U.S. economy has been organized
largely according to the principle encompassed in its antitrust laws: Vigor-
ous competition should be the predominant means for promoting a strong
industrial base and stimulating long-term economic growth.
In this Article, we first discuss the historical origins of the debate over
industrial policy. This discussion comprises the classical economists' cri-
tique of mercantilism, as well as the early tension in the United States
between antitrust and regulatory policies, which culminated in the differ-
ing policy prescriptions of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.
Next, we examine the National Recovery Administration, the only com-
prehensive and centralized peacetime industrial policy in the history of the
United States. We then consider current international experiences with
"indicative planning" policies-policies that rely heavily on government
guidance and industry cooperation. Finally, we assess the feasibility of
adopting such policies within the unique framework of the American po-
litical system, and the implications of such a program for U.S. political
institutions.
I. The Origins of the Debate Over Industrial Policy
A. The Challenge Posed by the Classical Economists
The first systematic, empirical studies of a centralized program of in-
dustrial policy were presented by Adam Smith and David Hume. Smith
and Hume demonstrated that government attempts to coordinate the ef-
forts of entrepreneurs almost invariably discouraged economic growth and
reduced economic well-being." s
In particular, Smith devoted much of his classic treatise, The Wealth of
Nations,"' to an empirical assessment of the system that he and Hume
called mercantilism. This system:
endeavours, either, by extraordinary encouragements, to draw to-
wards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital
of the society than what would naturally go to it; or, by extraordi-
12. See generally, U.S. GOV'T ACCT. OFF., LESSONS LEARNED FROM CONSTRUCTING THE TRANS-
ALASKA PIPELINE (1978) (report to Congress by the U.S. Comptroller General).
13. See A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Canaan ed. 1937) (1st ed. 1776); Rotwein, Intro-
duction to DAVID HUME-WRITINGS ON ECONOMICS at lxxviii-lxxxi (E. Rotwein ed. 1955) (on
Hume's condemnation of domestic market-restrictions in his HISTORY OF ENGLAND).
14. See, e.g., A. SMITH, supra note 13, at 627-53.
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nary restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some
share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it ...."
Smith concluded that mercantilism "retards, instead of accelerating, the
progress of the society towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes,
instead of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of its land and
labour.""'
Smith found two basic reasons for the failure of the industrial policies
of his day: a tendency of special interests to turn government programs to
their own narrow advantages,' 7 and a tendency of joint business efforts to
result in collusion to reduce output and raise prices, especially when gov-
ernment willingly permits such collusion.' According to Smith:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merri-
ment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against
the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible
indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be
executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though
the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes as-
sembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assem-
blies; much less to-render them necessary.' 9
The first comprehensive experiment with the alternative, competitive
approach to industrial policy-the founding of the American state-began
in 1776, the year that Smith's treatise was first published. Milton and
Rose Friedman have observed that, from the American Revolution until
about 1929, the nation enjoyed substantial economic growth and prosper-
ity, as well as unparallelled advances of human freedoms." Of course,
government coordination and business cooperation played a role in foster-
ing U.S. economic development-as is demonstrated by the experience
with railroad land grants, agricultural research programs, and the build-
ing of canals and turnpikes." Each of these programs involved substantial
15. Id. at 650.
16. Id. at 651; see also Rotwein, supra note 13.
17. Smith, for example, spoke of the ability of manufacturing interests to "intimidate the legisla-
ture" and specifically to block the restoration of free trade in Britain. Id. at 437-38. These
"[mierchants and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest advantage from this monopoly
of the home-market." Id. at 426.
18. Id. at 60-62.
19. Id. at 128.
20. M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 35-37 (1980).
21. See D. NORTH, ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1860, at 143 (1966); L.
DAVIS, AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 391-93, 475-85, 495-97, 648-50 (1972); W. BROWNLEE,
DYNAMICS OF ASCENT 228-31 (1974).
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external benefits for the entire economy, however, and was thus consistent
with Adam Smith's public works rationale for government intervention."
B. The First Proposals for a Centrally Coordinated US. Policy
The term "industrial policy" is a recent addition to the lexicon of
American public affairs but, as shown by Adam Smith's discussion of
mercantilism, it embraces fundamental economic issues with significant,
long-lived antecedents. In several important periods in American history,
moreover, the basic questions of whether government should shape indus-
trial activity directly and how it might do so have commanded the atten-
tion of public officials, business leaders, and scholars."3 A brief examina-
tion of the origins of the country's experience with centrally coordinated
industrial policies illuminates the current debate.
Although it is possible to identify other actions of the U.S. government
which foreshadowed modern industrial policy, two efforts with special sig-
nificance for the present debate were begun roughly a century ago. In
1887, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, 4 which forbade cer-
tain forms of price discrimination in rail transportation and established
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) with authority to "regulate
and oversee many aspects of the railroad industry. 26 As its powers were
expanded over subsequent decades, the ICC eventually assumed responsi-
bility for coordinating business activity (including the setting of rates and
control of entry and exit) in several transportation sectors-first rail, and
later motor carrier and water transportation.26 Only three years after the
22. A. SMITH, supra note 13, at 681-768. According to Smith's public works rationale, govern-
ment must erect and maintain certain public institutions and public works which are advantageous to
society, but which would not generate enough revenue to make it profitable for an individual or small
number of individuals to maintain them. Such institutions and works include those necessary for
education, defense, administering justice, and facilitating commerce.
23. See, e.g., REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE (T. McCraw ed. 1981) (collection of essays discussing
the history of U.S. economic regulation); OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS, BUREAU OF COMPETITION,
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: HISTORIANS' PERSPECTIVES OF ANTI-
TRUST AND GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES (1981); Kovacic, The
Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J.
587, 602-11 (1982).
24. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C.).
25. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, §§ 2-6, 11, 24 Stat. 379, 379-83 (1887) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). For discussions of the origins and aims of the Interstate
Commerce Act, see 1 L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 17-90 (1931); P.
MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION: THE TRUNKLINE RAILROAD CARTELS AND
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION BEFORE 1900, at 111-13 (1965); Hilton, The Consistency
of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 87 (1966).
26. Congress reiterated and expanded the ICC's authority to regulate railroads through the Elkins
Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-103, 32 Stat. 847, the Hepburn Act amendments of 1906, Pub. L. No.
59-337, 34 Stat. 584, and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539 (these acts
are codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). Collectively these measures strengthened
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ICC's creation, Congress passed the Sherman Act of 1890,7 which em-
braced what would prove to be a largely different approach toward the
government's role in the market. Although they embodied a wide range of
congressional and public aspirations, the Sherman Act and its antitrust
progeny2" rested upon a preference for market forces as a means of or-
ganizing the nation's economic life. 9 Thus, in a brief but important pe-
riod, Congress enacted two contending models for the government's role in
the economy.
Neither the Sherman Act nor the Interstate Commerce Act was the
final word on industrial policy. The issue of government's proper role in
shaping business behavior commanded widespread attention in the presi-
dential election campaign of 1912. The platform of Theodore Roosevelt's
Progressive Party urged that the federal government's power be used to
force private industry to serve broad public goals.8 Roosevelt contem-
the existing ban in the Interstate Commerce Act against rebating and price discrimination, expressly
granted the Commission power to prescribe maximum rates and control rate increases, and enlarged
its enforcement powers. Congress extended the ICC's regulatory authority to interstate motor and
water transportation through, respectively, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49
Stat. 543 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), and the Transportation Act of
1940, Pub. L. No. 76-785, 54 Stat. 898 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
27. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-6, 8, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
28. The Sherman Act's progeny include the Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 1-10, 38 Stat. 730-34
(1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-20 (1982)); and the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch.
311, §§ 1-11, 38 Stat. 717-19 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982)). For a further
discussion of the FTC Act, see infra text accompanying notes 57 to 73.
29. For a recent discussion of the goals of the Sherman Act and a summary of the literature
analyzing the objectives of American antitrust legislation, see Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Origi-
nal and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
65 (1982). The public mood that spurred congressional moves in the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries to redress monopoly is discussed in R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 213-69 (1955); H.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 54-163, 235-368 (1955); S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO
INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914, at 4-93 (1957); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at
1-163 (1967).
30. A. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 18-21 (1954); R. HOFSTADTER,
supra note 29, at 249-54. Two major works helped develop Roosevelt's thinking on these issues. The
first was H. CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909). On Croly's significance to Roosevelt's
thinking, see A. LINK, supra at 18-19, and E. GOLDMAN, RENDEVOUS WITH DESTINY 146-65 (1955).
Regarded by many historians as the philosophical foundation for the early 20th century progressive
movement, Croly's book sought to overcome the historical perception that equated a Hamiltonian
policy of government intervention with aristocracy and special privilege. This attitude, he argued, had
inhibited the creation of national policies to achieve Jeffersonian, or democratic, ends. To reach these
goals, the country needed a "new nationalism" in which the federal government would assume an
active role in changing economic and social conditions.
The second publication was C. VAN HISE, CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL: A SOLUTION OF THE
TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1912). Van Hise believed economic concentration was
predetermined by the evolution of modern business. In his view, strategies designed to arrest this
process through antitrust enforcement were either futile or counterproductive. Nonetheless, he be-
lieved administrative control of the products of this evolutionary trend was essential: "[Ilf we allow
concentration and cooperation, there must be control in order to protect the people, and adequate
control is only possible through the administrative commission." Id. at 278. On Roosevelt's reliance on
Van Hise's view, see A. SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 1919-1933, at 22 (1957).
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plated creating a federal agency with authority to regulate virtually all
major aspects of corporate activity. Such a body would have established
hours, wages, and other conditions of labor, set maximum prices for goods
produced by firms with "dominant" positions in their industries, com-
pelled the publication of company accounts, controlled the issuance of se-
curities, and investigated business activity in general.8 His system would
have tolerated the level of corporate growth needed to achieve the benefits
of large-scale production, but would have ensured that industry serve spe-
cific public ends.
To his Democratic Party opponent, Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt's pro-
gram seemed perilous. Wilson reasoned that if government began to tell
business leaders how to run their businesses, business interests would
"capture the government, in order not to be restrained too much by it."8'
Rather than accept what he called an "avowed partnership between the
government and the trusts," 8 Wilson proposed a reduction in tariffs and
greater reliance upon antitrust enforcement to secure competition.34 This
competition would in turn stimulate superior performance. The preven-
tion of monopoly, Wilson argued, would guarantee that "the limitations
on private enterprise shall be removed, so that the next generation of
youngsters, as they come along, will not have to become proteges of benev-
olent trusts, but will be free to go about making [of] their own lives what
they will . . .-.
To many observers, the contending views of Wilson and Roosevelt re-
flected a sharp philosophical split over government's proper role in influ-
encing economic activity."6 Historian George Mowry has noted that "one
school cherished the competitive system with its individual values and
31. Roosevelt, The Trusts, the People, and the Square Deal, 99 THE OUTLOOK 649 (1911). Dur-
ing his presidency Theodore Roosevelt had acquired a reputation as a "trustbuster" because of several
major Sherman Act prosecutions, including his Administration's successful effort to dissolve the
Northern Securities Company, a holding company for three of the country's larger railroads. See
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). Over time, however, Roosevelt became
increasingly disenchanted with the Sherman Act as a tool for government economic regulation. By the
time of America's entry into World War I, he publicly had turned against the statute. See T.
ROOSEVELT, THE FOES OF OUR OWN HOUSEHOLD 122 (1917).
32. W. WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 201-02 (1913). Wilson's economic thinking drew heavily
upon the views of Louis Brandeis, whom Wilson first met in August 1912. "[It was Brandeis," Link
writes, "who clarified Wilson's thought and led him to believe the most vital question confronting the
American people was preservation of economic freedom in the United States. Brandeis taught, and
Wilson agreed and reiterated in his speeches, that the main task ahead was to provide the means by
which business could be set free from the shackles of monopoly and special privilege." A. LINK, supra
note 30, at 20-21.
33. W. WILSON, supra note 32, at 202.
34. See, A. LINK, WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 178, 241 (1956).
35. W. WILSON, supra note 32, at 222.
36. See, e.g., G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1900-1912, at 57 (1958); A.
LINK, supra note 30, at 18-21 (1954); J. BLUM, WOODROW WILSON AND THE POLITICS OF MORAL-
ITY 59-62 (1956).
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feared the powerful state; the other welcomed concentrated power whether
in industry or politics, looked to a paternalistic state staffed by an edu-
cated elite for leadership, and depreciated individualism.""
After his victory in the general election, Wilson swiftly moved to imple-
ment the chief elements of his economic program. In 1913 he secured con-
gressional approval of the Underwood Tariff Act,8" which produced the
first substantial tariff reductions since the Civil War. In 1914 Wilson
asked Congress to augment the Sherman Act's broad provisions with a
roster of specific illegal practices and to establish a new trade commission
with advisory, investigatory, and prosecutorial powers in the antitrust
field.39 Congress ultimately approved Wilson's two antitrust initiatives as
the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, but engaged in exten-
sive debate about the new Commission's policymaking function. In partic-
ular, the legislators debated whether the agency should promote competi-
tion or, alternatively, should become the engine for comprehensive
regulation envisioned by Roosevelt and his supporters in the 1912
campaign.40
Congress endorsed the former of these two models in establishing the
Federal Trade Commission.4 The agency's new "regulatory" role would
be narrow. The Commission would investigate, publicize, and remedy
market failures that hindered the competitive process."2 It would not,
however, perform the comprehensive oversight urged in some of
Roosevelt's proposals for federal regulation.
Notwithstanding its considerable legislative success, Wilson's "New
Freedom" economic program drew a harsh assessment from observers
37. G. MOWRY, supra note 36, at 57.
38. Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 128, 130, 131
(1982)). The battle for tariff reductions provided a stern test of Wilson's market-oriented convictions.
Congressional consideration of the Underwood bill stimulated an unprecedented lobbying campaign,
as representatives of interests shielded by the tariff crowded the nation's capital. The spectacle out-
raged Wilson, who said Washington was so besieged by lobbyists that "a brick couldn't be thrown
without hitting one of them." A. LINK, supra note 30, at 41. "It is of serious interest to the country,"
Wilson declared soon afterwards, "that the people at large should have no lobby and be voiceless in
these matters, while great bodies of astute men seek to create an artificial opinion and to overcome the
interests of the public for their private profit." N.Y. Times, May 27, 1913, at 1, col. 1, quoted in A.
LINK, supra note 30, at 41.
39. See, A. LINK, supra note 30, at 436-42.
40. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. H9538-611 (1914) (debates over the Clayton Act); 51 CONG. REC.
SI1,870-876 (debates over bill to establish the Federal Trade Commission). See also A. LINK, supra
note 30, at 68-73 (describing the opposition of various groups in Congress to the Clayton and Federal
Trade Commission bills.)
41. S. REP. NO. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1914); see also T. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 1-2 (1932).
42. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, §§ 5-16, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. §§ 45-56 (1982)).
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such as Walter Lippmann. Antitrust enforcement and other competitive
policies, Lippmann wrote, foolishly obstructed modern industrial progress:
If the anti-trust people really grasped the full meaning of what
they said, and if they really had the power or the courage to do what
they propose, they would be engaged in one of the most destructive
agitations that America has known. They would be breaking up the
beginning of a collective organization, thwarting the possibility of co-
6peration, and insisting upon submitting industry to the wasteful,
the planless scramble of little profiteers. They would make impossi-
ble any deliberate and constructive use of our natural resources, they
would thwart any effort to form the great industries into coordinated
services, they would preserve commercialism as the undisputed
master of our lives, they would lay a premium on the strategy of
industrial war,-they would, if they could."
The crucial failing of these "anti-trust people," Lippmann concluded, was
that they never saw "the possibilities of organized industries."""
II. The First American Experiments
Lippmann's caustic evaluation of competition as the core principle of
economic organization accompanied his recommendation that business and
government join in a cooperative venture to direct the economy."' During
the next two decades, the federal government tried three major experi-
ments with such cooperative programs: the War Industries Board, the
"associationalist" policies of Herbert Hoover, and the National Recovery
Administration. Viewed from the standpoint of consumer welfare, the two
peacetime experiments were dismal failures.
A. The War Industries Board
America's entry into World War I in 1917 presented the first opportu-
nity to pursue a cooperative policy of the type proposed by Lippmann.
Central planning and coordination strategies received unprecedented at-
tention during the American war mobilization effort." Through the War
Industries Board (WIB), the federal government exercised sweeping
43. W. LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 124 (1914).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 138-41. Lippmann notes that the men of the new generation "have the vast opportunity
of introducing order and purpose into the business world, of devising administrative methods by which
the great resources of the country can be operated on some thought-out plan." Id. at 141.
46. See Himmelberg, The War Industries Board and the Antitrust Question in November 1918,
52 J. AM. HIST. 59 (1965) [hereinafter cited as "Himmelberg, The War Industries Board"]; Cuff,
Business, the State, and World War I: The American Experience, in THE ORDEAL OF TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA, INTERPRETIVE READINGS 48 U. Schwartz ed. 1974).
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power over the nation's economy, controlling production priorities, re-
source allocation, and pricing. 7 The WIB sanctioned and promoted coop-
erative business efforts that during peacetime could have resulted in crimi-
nal violations of the Sherman Act.
4 8
The war mobilization effort produced the country's first major experi-
ment in comprehensive government economic planning. As historian Eric
Goldman describes it, this experiment convinced many leaders in business,
government, and academia that the WIB model of government-business
cooperation deserved a trial in peacetime as well:
Many of the dollar-a-year men went back to their fifty-thousand-
dollar-a-year jobs with an idea buzzing in their heads. Perhaps their
decades-old battle for "free competition" and against "government in
business" had not been wise. They had been given striking proof
that federal activity need-not be anti-business, and they had seen the
advantages that could come from joint operations under federal
aegis. ' 9
To Bernard Baruch, who headed the WIB, the experience with central
control had shown antitrust law to be an anachronism.5" The WIB, he
noted, had enabled businessmen to enjoy "the tremendous advantages,
both to themselves and to the general public, of combination, of coopera-
tion and common action with their natural competitors."'"
B. Hoover's Associationalism
At the war's conclusion, many WIB veterans sought to apply the les-
sons of the mobilization effort to the peacetime economy.5 Some business
leaders tried, without success, to obtain a continuing, formal relaxation of
antitrust enforcement." In addition, much effort went into the develop-
47. W. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY 1914-1932, at 39-40 (1958); A.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 37-38. See generally B. BARUCH, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR
(1941) (a compilation on industrial mobilization for war including Baruch's 1921 Report of the War
Industries Board).
48. Himmelberg, The War Industries Board, supra note 46, at 60-62.
49. E. GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 237. This feeling was especially pronounced among adherents
to the Rooseveltian brand of progressivism. Donald Richberg, who worked in Roosevelt's 1912 cam-
paign and who would become head of the National Recovery Administration in the 1930's, observed:
"The truth is that no man of any political intelligence and economic vision has been able to defend the
existing economic order since the World War laid bare its utter inadequacy and its insane conse-
quences." D. RICHBERG, TENTS OF THE MIGHTY 81-82 (1930).
50. B. BARUCH, supra note 47, at 104-07. Baruch called the antitrust laws "a moderately ambi-
tious effort to reduce by Government interference the processes of business so as to make them con-
form to the simpler principles sufficient for the conditions of a bygone day." Id. at 104.
51. Id. at 105.
52. Himmelberg, The War Industries Board, supra note 46, at 60-62.
53. See id. at 62-63. See generally R. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY
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ment of trade associations and other devices for industry self-regulation."
The principal patron of this "associationalist" movement was Herbert
Hoover, who, as Secretary of Commerce and President, encouraged the
formation of trade associations and professional societies." A Hoover ad-
mirer, Jean Monnet, later renamed the Hoover philosophy "indicative
planning" and "made it the basis both for France's post-war planning
system and for the European Economic Community. '
Hoover's associationalist values strongly influenced the activities of gov-
ernment agencies whose charters nominally committed them to promote
competition. The Federal Trade Commission's 1928 Annual Report, for
example, reveals the impact of associationalist values on that agency's
work:
Never in the history of American business has there been a time
when self-regulation has received more intensive consideration ....
If an industry is capable of self-regulation the trade practice confer-
ence procedure of the Federal Trade Commission affords the most
effective method yet devised to accomplish this end .. . .Trade as-
sociations, "institutes," the United States Chamber of Commerce,
and business organizations in other forms have done, and are doing,
excellent work in this respect . . ..
The trade practice conference, discussed in the above quotation, was the
most important manifestation of associational attitudes in the 1920's."
ADMINISTRATION: BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE TRADE ASSOCIATION ISSUE, 1921-1933 (1976).
54. Himmelberg, The War Industries Board, supra note 46, at 60-61. See also U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, TRADE ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES (1927); FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, OPEN PRICE AS.
SOCIATIONS (1929); Trade Associations: Cooperation or Restraint of Trade, 12 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI.
3-99 (1926); Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an "Associative
State," 1921-1928, 56 J. AM. HIST. 116, 139 (1974). Hawley estimates that the number of major
national associations grew from approximately 700 in 1919 to more than 2,000 in 1929. The number
of lesser statewide or regional bodies may have been much larger. See C. WILCOX, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 225 (1940) (T.N.E.C. Monogram No. 21).
55. Hawley, supra note 54; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 84-89; J. HICKS, REPUBLICAN
ASCENDANCY 1921-1933, at 12 (1960). Although Hoover supported certain forms of intra-industry
coordination, he generally opposed attempts to push such coordination activities beyond the limits
established by prevailing Supreme Court antitrust decisions and beyond "the point at which competi-
tion and cooperation could be reconciled ideologically." R. HIMMELBERG, supra note 53, at 220.
Hoover would later denounce the National Recovery Administration's voluntary industry codes as
"totalitarian" for their use of government compulsion. P. JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES 256 (1983).
56. P. JOHNSON, supra note 55, at 243.
57. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1928) (showing the impact of associationalist
values on the Federal Trade Commission); Hawley, supra note 54, at 136 (showing the impact of
associationalist values on the Department of Justice). See also T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, THE AGE
OF ENTERPRISE 345-46 (1942).
58. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, supra note 57, at 5.
59. The trade practice conference, which began in 1919, went by the name of "trade practice
submittal" until 1925. See generally Kittelle & Mostow, A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences
of the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427 (1940).
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Outwardly designed to suppress "unfair" or "unscrupulous" forms of bus-
iness behavior, the conferences in practice acted to curb legitimate means
of competition. The FTC initiated the conferences by inviting all firms in
an industry to meet in the presence of a commissioner and members of the
commissioner's staff to discuss disputed practices within the trade. 0 When
a majority of the conferees opposed some business tactic, the conferees
approved resolutions calling for a ban on the suspect practices."' If the
FTC endorsed the conferees' views, it could classify the resolutions as ei-
ther "Group I" or "Group II" rules." The Commission treated violations
of Group I rules as prima facie violations of the FTC Act and sought
cease and desist orders to halt them." For violations of Group II rules,
however, the FTC based its decision to prosecute on the circumstances of
each claimed infraction."
The trade conference mechanism gradually grew from several meetings
per year in the early 1920's to become one of the Commission's chief en-
forcement activities by the end of that decade."' Approximately sixty con-
ferences were held between July 1927 and November 1929."
For some observers, the FTC's reliance on the conferences displayed a
healthy inclination to replace competition-preserving enforcement with co-
operation-based policies. 7 From a consumer welfare perspective, however,
the effect of the conferences hinged mainly on whether the rules the Com-
mission endorsed were actually sanctioning or fostering collusion. In this
important respect, the Commission failed to protect consumer interests. By
the end of the 1920's, the Commission routinely endorsed codes that
tended to restrict output. Arthur Schlesinger's history of the period states:
"Though dedicated to the elimination of 'unfair' trade practices, the codes
60. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, TRADE PRACTICE SUBMITTALS 1919 TO 1923 (1923); Mc-
Carty, Trade Practice Conferences, 2 CORP. PRAC. REV. 19 (1930).
61. For a general discussion of the trade practice conference procedures, see Kittelle & Mostow,
supra note 59. See also A. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 69-73 (1936); T. BLAISDELL,
supra note 41, at 93-98.
62. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 59, at 428.
63. Id.
64. Id., at 428-29.
65. T. BLAISDELL, supra note 64, at 91-94.
66. Id. at 94.
67. In 1930, one former Commission official applauded this shift in emphasis:
The trade practice conference marks the beginning of systematic cooperative effort between
various progressive industries and the government to establish and enforce intelligent rules of
business conduct. It permits industries to become self-governing through responsible trade or-
ganizations whose activities are supervised in the public interest by the Federal Trade Com-
mission .... It creates among businessmen a more enlightened sense of their responsibility to
the public, and it creates ... in the public a similar sense of its responsibility to permit
business interests ... to conduct business on sound economic principles of cooperative effort as
distinguished from destructive competition.
McCarty, supra note 60, at 29.
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gradually began to spill over into such questions as price-cutting and, in
some cases, provided fronts behind. which businessmen fraternally con-
spired to evade the antitrust law." 6k\Many trade agreements were "essen-
tially smoke screens to permit price fixing."' Some codes so alarmed the
Justice Department that the Antitrust Division in 1930 called for the
FTC to condemn trade agreements that seemed to violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 70 This effort was successful.71
Once the Great Depression persisted through 1932, however, there
emerged substantial pressure for reinstating the authority of the FTC to
permit trade groups to fix prices, allocate production, and consummate
mergers and acquisitions that were "prohibited or which might be consid-
ered prohibited by the Anti-Trust Acts."'7 The supporters of cooperation
between industry and government were concerned that destructive compe-
tition was severely inhibiting economic recovery.78
C. The National Recovery Administration
The World War I mobilization and the associationalist experiments of
the 1920's had given the planners and cooperation advocates important, if
limited, tests of their theories. The economic collapse of 1929, however,
spurred the ideological descendants of Theodore Roosevelt to promote co-
operation-based policies that might have displaced the competition model
permanently. Leading War Industries Board members such as Bernard
Baruch and Gerard Swope asked that the federal government suspend an-
titrust laws to permit business self-regulation.7 4 A younger group of aca-
demicians and public administrators, including Rexford G. Tugwell, A.
68. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 65. See also Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 59, at 436-38;
W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 47; E. GOLDMAN, supra note 30, at 237; T. BLAISDELL, supra note
41, at 95-96; T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, supra note 57, at 346, 348; J. CLARK, THE FEDERAL
TRUST POLICY 231-32 (1931). Clark observed that, in the late 1920's, "(tlhe industrialists persisted
. . .in their effort to exploit the opportunity they found in the trade practice conference to temper the
warfare of industrial competition and they were successful in devising euphemisms for trade-
restraining agreements which escaped the attention of the commission . . . ." Id.
69. C. Roos, NRA ECONOMIC PLANNING 16 (1937). Roos served as Director of Research for the
NRA during its two-year existence.
70. Id. at 16; E. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 132 (1936); R.
HIMMELBERG, supra note 53, at 93-98.
71. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 16.
72. Id. at 17.
73. E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 27, 40-41 (1966).
74. See Baruch, A Plan for the Regulation of Production, in A PHILOSOPHY OF PRODUCTION 93,
101-03 U. Frederick ed. 1930). Gerard Swope, president of General Electric Corp., proposed the use
of trade associations to coordinate industry-wide production and stabilize prices. A government eco-
nomic council would oversee the associations. Swope was one of several industrialists, including
Walter Teagle of Standard Oil of New Jersey and Myron Taylor of U.S. Steel, who wanted govern-
ment action to adjust production to demand. See also A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 181-82; B.
BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE NRA 3 (1975).
Vol. 2: 1, 1984
Industrial Policy
A. Berle, and Gardner Means, supplied the theoretical foundation for pol-
icies that would permit government to coordinate economic activity on the
basis of plans proposed by each industry.75 Finally, the inauguration of
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 brought into office a "new Administration,
skeptical of the individualism of the past, expressing confidence in a
greater degree of collective action, and heralding a 'New Deal' .''7
The early New Deal drew upon the country's war mobilization and
associationalist experiences in its efforts to stimulate economic recovery. 7
The country embarked upon an unprecedented program of peacetime eco-
nomic planning in June 1933 with passage of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act (NIRA)78 The statute created the National Recovery Admin-
istration (NRA), 9 which promptly set about procuring trade agreements
or "codes" for individual industries covering output, prices, wages, work-
ing conditions, investment, and trade practices such as advertising. Within
a year the NRA had produced 450 codes covering 5 million employers
and 23 million workers.8"
75. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932);
R. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL ARTS (1933). For a discussion
of the influence of these works upon the evolution of business-government cooperation theories in the
early 1930's, see W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 34-35 (1963);
A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 190-97.
76. L. LYON, P. HOMAN, G. TERBORGH, L. LORWIN, C. DEARING & L. MARSHALL, THE NA-
TIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 3 (1935) [hereinafter cited as L. LYON].
77. A. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 87-94 (1959) R. HIMMELBERG, supra
note 53, at 181-82; W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 47, at 41-42; B. BELLUSH, supra note 74, at 14,
16, 45; L. GALAMBOS, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL TRADE
ASSOCIATION, 201-02 (1966). See generally E. HAWLEY, supra note 73.
78. Act of June 16, 1933, Pub. L. No. 67, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). "It is hereby declared to be
the policy of Congress to ... provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of indus-
try for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of
labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair
competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of
industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to in-
crease the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to
reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate indus-
try and to conserve natural resources."
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was another New Deal program with implications
for the present industrial policy debate; however, it was not involved in the tripartite microeconomic
planning with which this article is concerned. The RFC began operations in January 1932 under the
Hoover Administration. The program operated both as a source of funds to aid failing banks and as
an investment bank to stimulate business, particularly small business. Although it apparently helped
preserve many struggling banks, the RFC "failed" many small businesses "in their hour of need." C.
ROOS, supra note 69, at 393. The RFC program played only a small role as an investment bank in
the 1930's; it had little or no impact on economic recovery.
79. The NIRA authorized President Roosevelt to establish "such agencies ...as he may find
necessary" to effectuate the policies of the Act. Act of June 16, 1933, Pub. L. No. 67, ch. 90, 48 Stat.
195 (1933). The NRA was established by executive order pursuant to Title I of the NIRA. Exec.
Order No. 6173 (1933); Exec. Order No. 6205-A (1933).
80. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at ix. The NRA appears to have modelled its code program on the
FTC's trade practice conference procedure. See A. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 463
(1936); see generally, R. HIMMELBERG, supra note 53.
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In promoting the bill, President Roosevelt stressed the importance of
joint business and government efforts to restore prosperity. For example,
on May 4, 1933, six weeks before the NIRA was passed, he told an ap-
proving audience at the United States Chamber of Commerce:
You and I acknowledge the existence of unfair methods of competi-
tion, of cutthroat prices and of general chaos. You and I agree that
this condition must be rectified and that order must be restored. The
attainment of that objective depends on your willingness to co-
operate with one another to that end, and also your willingness to
co-operate with your Government."1
In signing the legislation President Roosevelt urged businesses to "band
themselves faithfully in ... modern guilds" and to unite in a "great spon-
taneous co-operation to put millions of men back to work in their regular
jobs."82 The President said: "We are relaxing some of the safeguards of
the antitrust laws .... [W]e are putting in place of old principles of un-
checked competition some new government controls ....""
Reaction on Wall Street to the introduction of the recovery legislation
generally had been bullish. 84 To many in the business community, indus-
try-wide codes designed to bar price-cutting and increase profits would be
a quid pro quo exchanged for labor's right to boost wages through collec-
tive bargaining.8 The bill had enjoyed broad support from what a 1935
Brookings Institution study called "[a] curious combination of. . .reform
81. Address by President Roosevelt to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (May 4, 1933), quoted in
C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 41.
82. F. ROOSEVELT, STATE OF POLICY ON INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT (June 16, 1933) quoted in
C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 53. The theme of "cooperation" soon emerged throughout what Hawley
called a "whole set of favorable collectivist symbols" to herald the ascendency of coordination strate-
gies over competition-oriented policies. Hawley observed:
New Deal and business spokesmen wrought a virtual revolution in popular symbolism. "Com-
petition" became "economic cannibalism" and "rugged individualists" became "industrial pi-
rates." Conservative industrialists, veteran antitrusters, and classical economists were all
lumped together and branded "social Neanderthalers," "Old Dealers," and "Corporals of Dis-
aster." The time-honored practice of reducing prices to gain a larger share of the market
became "cut-throat and monopolistic price slashing," and those that engaged in this dastardly
activity became "chiselers." Conversely, monopolistic collusion, price agreements, proration,
and cartelization became "cooperative" or "associational" activities-and devices that were
chiefly designed to eliminate competition bore the euphemistic title, "Codes of Fair
Competition."
E. HAWLEY, supra note 73, at 54.
83. F. ROOSEVELT, STATE OF POLICY ON INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT (June 16, 1933), quoted in
C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 53.
84. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 43-45; E. HAWLEY, supra note 73, at 26-28.
85. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 234; B. BELLUSH, supra note 74, at 16-17, 28. Within the business
community there was opposition to the NRA from smaller firms seeking to enter or expand in selected
industries and from firms whose operations had been largely profitable. R. HIMMELBERG, supra note
53, at 221-22; L. GALAMBOS, supra note 77, at 226.
Vol. 2: 1, 1984
Industrial Policy
groups, business groups, and labor groups, each seeing in the developing
bill an opportunity to promote ends of its own."86
The NRA allowed participation of three principal groups in its code-
making deliberations: In addition to the Administrator and his deputies,
the NRA had a Consumer Advisory Board, a Labor Advisory Board, and
an Industrial Advisory Board. In theory, each industry's "code" was to be
set in a "forum of cooperation" in which the NRA planner would steer
"unselfish" group interests toward mutually satisfactory agreements."7 In
practice, this "idealized version" yielded to the "realities of an out and out
bargaining process, in which selfish interests were played against one
another."88
The dominant members of the tripartite coalitions were the trade as-
sociations. An NRA release noted that the new law's relaxation of anti-
trust strictures had given the associations a new importance. It said,
"They are almost a part of the government and they can do and agree to
many more things than they could do before.""9 A Brookings study de-
scribed the new efforts of the associations to free their members from the
hostile forces of competition:
[C]ommittees of business men were crowding into Washington and
staying for weeks and months for the privilege of increasing their
costs by raising wages and reducing hours of work. For the most
part, they were there to secure a sufficient quid pro quo, hoping (as
against official pronouncements) that the quid would sufficiently out-
weigh the quo to make the effort worthwhile in terms of profits. The
imaginations of groups of business men were fired by the prospect of
removing or mitigating the competitive handicaps to which they so
largely attributed the unhappy absence of profits.90
Indeed, the "central motivating force" of the trade associations was the
86. L. LYON, supra note 76, at 7. See also E. HAWLEY, supra note 73, at 33 ("Within the confines
of a single measure, ... the formulators of the National Industrial Recovery Act had appealed to the
hopes of a number of conflicting pressure groups").
Not everyone, however, embraced the new legislation. "Opposition to the proposal," Hawley wrote,
"came from antitrusters and small business liberals, men who stressed the evils of monopoly and were
reluctant to abandon the competitive tradition." Id. at 29. Among the leading intellectual opponents of
the bill were architects of and successors to Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom program. Justice Louis
Brandeis, whom Wilson had appointed to the Supreme Court, attacked in his correspondence the
proposed bill because of "the impossibility of enforcement, the dangers to the small industries, the
inefficiency of the big unit, be it governmental or private." N. DAWSON, Louis D. BRANDEIS, FELIX
FRANKFURTER, AND THE NEW DEAL 66 (1980).
87. L. LYON, supra note 76, at 83-85.
88. Id. at 85.
89. Id. at 89, n.7, (quoting NRA Release No. 11, June 25, 1933); see also, E. HAWLEY, supra
note 73, at 55-62; B. BELLUSH, supra note 74, at 45; R. HIMMELBERG, supra note 53, at 211.
90. L. LYON, supra note 76, at 91-92.
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desire to improve prices and profits by "collective action."9 Labor groups,
too, were pleased to secure a quid pro quo in the form of higher wages,
and government administrators no doubt enjoyed their newly found power
over commerce and trade.
These gains to business, labor, and government interests, however, fre-
quently came at the expense of consumers. The government planners,
"hungrily seeking new fields to conquer, seized upon any reason for ex-
tending their domain."" For example, the NRA granted monopolies to
the copper and petroleum industries in the name of environmental preser-
vation as well as national defense." In addition to the deliberate creation
of monopolies, moreover, NRA administrators readily acquiesced in nu-
merous code provisions that facilitated "monopolistic or semi-monopolistic
prices." '9 Some codes fostered extensive and explicit collusion among bid-
ders for state, local, and federal government contracts, thereby raising
profits for the favored firms.9" Others facilitated clandestine price-fixing"
and restricted interregional product shipments.' The glass container in-
dustry received an especially strong code as a reward for helping the gov-
ernment enforce the liquor revenue laws.' 8 And restrictions on timber
production guaranteed prices equal to several times the replacement value
of the timber.99 The codes of the timber, copper, and glass container in-
dustries all "had their origin in pre-code price-fixing activities of the
groups concerned."100
All such practices led to "consumer gouging."' ' They also harmed
smaller firms because the larger firms dominated the code-making deliber-
ations.10 2 Moreover, although NRA activities successfully raised profits
and wages for many of the favored firms and their employees, the agency
substantially impeded recovery from the Depression.'0 " In 1935, when the
91. Id. at 94. See also E. HAWLEY, supra note 73, at 56-62.
92. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 360.
93. Id. at 354-58, 359.
94. Id. at 373.
95. Id. at 323.
96. Id. at 289; E. HAWLEY, supra note 73, at 57-61.
97. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 372-73.
98. Id. at 360.
99. Id. at 250.
100. Id. at 360; see also L. GALAMBOS, supra note 77, at 201-02 (discussing the application of the
NRA codes to the cotton textile industry).
101. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 467.
102. Id. at 416; L. LYON, supra note 76, at 745; W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 47, at 69.
103. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 415-16; L. LYON, supra note 76, at 873-76; N. DAWSON, supra
note 86, at 65, 73 (concluding that the NRA "retarded" recovery). See also E. HAWLEY, supra note
73, at 131-32; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 77, at 172-76; B. BELLUSH, supra note 74, at 61-64,
70-71, 80-82, 140, 144, 149-50, 161, 165-67. Bellush records criticism of the NRA's output restrict-
ing effects by Brookings Economist George Terborgh and John Maynard Keynes. B. BELLUSH, supra
note 74, at 63-64, 144. Bellush writes that Keynes, who argued that the NRA had been put across too
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NRA was effectively abolished by a Supreme Court decision, 0 4 the unem-
ployment rate stood at 20 percent.10 5 This figure was less than the rate
inherited by the Roosevelt Administration, but was more than six times
the rate in 1929.106 In the words of Charles F. Roos, who had served as
the NRA's Director of Research, the Court's action had "destroyed the
monstrosity, that during 1934 and 1935 had kept business in a churn,
prevented reemployment, and consequently retarded economic
development.
'107
The lesson for future students of industrial policy was clear: Attempts
at economic planning would deteriorate into nothing more than bargain-
ing between economic groups. Monopolistic advantages would be ex-
changed for labor concessions, with the choicest gains flowing to the
groups exhibiting the greatest political power. As Roos concluded two
years after the NRA's demise: "To trust the economic order to such 'plan-
ners' would be rash indeed; there would be a greater chance that they
would reduce it to chaos than that a baby handed a watch and hammer
would smash the watch."10 8
Although the NRA was the most far-reaching industrial policy pursued
in the 1930's, it was not the only such policy. The economic collapse gave
rise to a wide range of programs designed to rescue various industries
from the effects of "cutthroat" competition. In the natural resource and
transportation fields, Congress enacted legislation which effectively con-
verted otherwise competitive industries into highly regulated, cartelized,
and often inefficient industries. 109 In the transportation field, the jurisdic-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission was extended to trucking, 10
and the Civil Aeronautics Board was established.11 to employ govern-
ment-sponsored cooperation in awarding routes and setting prices. A large
hastily "in the false guise of being part of the technique of recovery," criticized the NRA's attempt to
raise prices "by deliberately increasing prime costs or by restricting output... B. BELLUSH, supra
note 74, at 63-64.
104. On May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court struck down the NIRA on the ground that the statute
was an unconstitutionally broad delegation of legislative power. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Only months earlier, the Court had invalidated the NRA's "hot oil"
provisions on similar grounds. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). On the day of
the Schechter decision, Justice Brandeis told newspaper reporters that May 27, 1935, was "the most
important day in the history of the Court and the most beneficent." Thomas Corcoran, one of Presi-
dent Roosevelt's advisors, later noted that, following Schecter, Brandeis said, "This is the end of this
business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the President that we're not going to let
this government centralize everything." N. DAWSON, supra note 86, at 129.
105. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, at 135.
106. See id.
107. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 472.
108. Id. at 467.
109. See, e.g., E. HAWLEY, supra note 73, at 205-80.
110. See supra note 26.
111. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973.
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body of literature has demonstrated that many of these cooperative ven-
tures produced tremendous social costs in the form of higher prices and
resource misallocation." 2 Indeed, only within the past decade have some
of the chief regulatory measures of the 1930's been repealed or substan-
tially modified to permit greater reliance on market forces." 3 These re-
forms have produced substantial gains for the general public." 4
III. Contemporary Industrial Policies
At the heart of the current industrial policy debate is the assertion that,
through tripartite (business, labor, and government) cooperation, govern-
ment can "guide" leading industries to successful growth opportunities.""
Proponents of industrial policy point to "indicative planning" policies in
other leading industrial nations, including France, West Germany, and
Japan as evidence of the benefits of coordinated action." 6 The experiences
of these countries, however, like U.S. experience with the NRA,'" pro-
vide little support for more centralized coordination.
A. Indicative Planning Policies of Japan
The "miracle" of "Japan, Inc." 8 is frequently offered as an example
of the benefits of coordinated policies." 9 Japan's Ministry of International
112. See, e.g., G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANS-
PORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974); Eads, Competition in the Domestic Trunk Airline Industry: Too
Much or Too Little? in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 13 (A. Phillips ed.
1975); Moore, Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGU-
LATED MARKETS 55 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
113. See, e.g., Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (partially deregulat-
ing railroads); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (partially deregu-
lating natural gas producers); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(partially deregulating airlines); and Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793
(partially deregulating trucking).
114. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD STAFF REPORT, COM-
PETITION AND THE AIRLINES: AN EVALUATION OF DEREGULATION (authored by D. Graham & D.
Kaplan, 1982); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION ANALYSIS, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, THE
INTERCITY BUS INDUSTRY (1984); Babcock, Efficiency and Adjustment: The Impact of Rail Deregula-
tion, 33 CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS (1984); Moore, Rail and Truck Reform-The Record
So Far, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 33, 36.
115. See, e.g., I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, supra note 6, at 377.
116. See, e.g., Weil, U.S. Industrial Policy: A Process in Need of a Federal Industrial Coordina-
tion Board, 14 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L BUS. 981, 1004-06 (1983); Krauss, "Europeanizing" the US.
Economy: The Enduring Appeal of the Corporatist State, in THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY DEBATE 71-90
(C. Johnson ed. 1984).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 74-114.
118. "Japan, Inc." is a phrase commonly used by writers on Japan to denote the close ties be-
tween Japanese companies and their government. See, e.g., Ohmae, Japan vs. Japan: Only the Strong
Survive, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 20, col. 1. For a critique of "Japan, Inc." see T. SAKIYA,
HONDA MOTOR: THE MEN, THE MANAGEMENT, THE MACHINES 137-38 (1982).
119. See, e.g., C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL
POLICY, 1925-1975 at 30-32, 305-24 (1982); Weil, supra note 116, at 1004, 1033-38.
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Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Bank of Japan have sought to facili-
tate coordinated activities among competing Japanese firms.12° As a major
element of its coordination efforts, MITI has sought to "cartelize and ra-
tionalize" several industries, sharing with them its "visions" of their com-
petitive futures and providing them for a time with substantial import
protection from foreign competition.1""
However, it is hardly clear that policies emphasizing cooperation and
joint planning have played a significant role in promoting Japan's phe-
nomenal economic growth.1 2  Indeed, there is considerable evidence that
Japan's efforts to concentrate Japanese industry and coordinate firms'
strategic behavior have frequently failed or produced unintended results.
For example, in a seven-year period during which MITI attempted to
concentrate Japan's cotton spinning industry, the 10-firm concentration
ratio fell from 89 to 50 percent. 28 In spite of MITI's efforts to consoli-
date Japan's emerging auto industry, the number of significant firms grew
from three to nine.124 And MITI's effort to concentrate the Japanese com-
puter industry's six firms into a single firm the equivalent of IBM never
got off the ground. 25
Many of the most successful Japanese industries, both concentrated and
unconcentrated, have consisted of vigorously independent firms. For exam-
ple, as mentioned above, Japanese auto companies successfully opposed
MITI's merger efforts2'2 and refused to heed the government's early ad-
vice to forego export sales;127 they also resisted MITI's efforts to allocate
sales and limit their export production to a "people's car. 12 8 When the
government sought to ban certain forms of non-price competition in the
pharmaceutical industry, fierce price competition erupted. 29 Sony resisted
120. To quote two leading authorities on Japanese industrial policies:
An important if fluid role in coordinating the actions of rival sellers has been played by
agencies of the Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry. In a number of industries MITI has taken an active hand to promote coordination
directly through "administrative guidance." The practice is without explicit statutory authority
or legalistic procedure-it would be unthinkable in the United States, and is at least somewhat
controversial in Japan's less legalistic political system.
R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN 53-54 (1976).
121. E. KAPLAN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, JAPAN: THE GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP
16, 39, 85 (1972).
122. See Trezise, Industrial Policy is Not the Major Reason for Japan's Success, 2 BROOKINGS
REV. 13-18 (Spring 1983); Sakoh, Industrial Policy: The Super Myth of Japan's Super Success,
HERITAGE FOUND. (July 13, 1983).
123. R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, supra note 120, at 55.
124. E. KAPLAN, supra note 121, at 108, 128; see also T. SAKIYA, supra note 118 at 134-137.
125. ECONOMIST, July 18, 1981, at 13.
126. R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, supra note 120, at 151; Sakoh, supra note 122, at 12.
127. W. DUNCAN, U.S.-JAPAN AUTOMOBILE DIPLOMACY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC CONFRONTA-
TION 73-74 (1973); Etzioni, The Mitization of America?, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1983, at 46.
128. ETZIONI, supra note 127, at 46; E. KAPLAN, supra note 121, at 121.
129. R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, supra note 120, at 50.
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MITI's efforts to prevent it from bringing transistor technology into
Japan."' ° Indeed, analysts have speculated that MITI's efforts to dis-
courage firms from entering certain industries may have acted on firms as
an artificial incentive to enter those industries and share in the expected
cartel profits.131 In short, intense domestic competition has been the pri-
mary factor in many of the major Japanese industrial successes. The man-
ufacturers have succeeded in spite of MITI's efforts to guide and coordi-
nate their decisions, not because of those efforts.
Moreover, even if the planning and cooperation model had some rele-
vance in the early post-war period, its current value is questionable. Jiro
Tokuyama, dean of the Nomura School of Advanced Management in
Tokyo, recently stated:
Coordination is all right if you're building a steel and car industry
on the model of other people. But now we're in an era of rapid
change, of integrated circuits and microprocessors. . . .I don't think
our large organizations can move quickly enough to make the
changes. We must find our model among the entrepreneurs like
[those] in your Silicon Valley."3 '
One indication that the planning model may be losing its relevance is that
some once-touted examples of successful Japanese planning have come on
hard times. Between 1977 and 1982, the Japanese shipbuilding industry
lost 46,000 jobs. 33 Between 1976 and 1981, imports' share of domestic
aluminum sales rose from 24 percent to 56 percent. 3 4 Even in steel,
where the Japanese supposedly have achieved great success, there is sub-
stantial excess capacity. Japanese firms have been calling for the applica-
tion of Japan's never-used laws prohibiting below-cost
sales- "dumping"-by foreign firms.130 Today, MITI is actively seeking
to reduce overcapacity in many of the very industries it is credited with
having created.136
In sum, the Japanese government does rely on a greater degree of con-
sensus-building than does the United States government. Much can be
learned from this greater degree of harmony among business, labor and
government. Neverthless, the Japanese success story arguably occurred de-
130. Henderson, The Myth of MITI, FORTUNE, Aug. 8, 1983, at 113; A Rising Tide of Protec-
tionism, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 1983, at 28.
131. R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, supra note 120, at 56.
132. Wash. Post, Apr. 29, 1984, at BI, col. 1.
133. Boyer, How Japan Manages Declining Industries, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 1983, at 60.
134. Id. at 62.
135. For example, Japanese petrochemical manufacturers have complained about dumping by
U.S. and Canadian firms. See ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1982, at 89.
136. See generally Boyer, supra note 133.
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spite any policies of planning and cooperation, not because of them. The
strongest Japanese industries are precisely those in which competition is
most vigorous. 87 Hence the policy implications of the Japanese experi-
ence are ambiguous at best.
B. Indicative Planning Policies of Western Europe
Like the myth of "Japan, Inc.," popular accounts of the success of in-
dicative planning policies in Western Europe are little more than folk sto-
ries. Both in France and in West Germany, attempts at comprehensive
planning and coordination have been largely unsuccessful.
The roots of French indicative planning, at least at a theoretical level,
reach back to the 18th century mercantilists, whose policies were criticized
by Smith and Hume."' This interventionist philosophy proposed that
government substitute "cooperation for conflict and competition,"' 3 ' and
that the state be "an active, initiating partner, not a distant policeman. Its
role [was] to create the structures of cooperation and through them to
guide the economy toward expansion and modernization." 4
In this tradition, the objective of recent French indicative planning poli-
cies was "to increase the scale and efficiency of French industrial produc-
tion"'' and to "construct a series of national champions which would
carry the French flag into battle against the foreign giants. '""" To the
French planners a "fundamental harmony of interest [existed] between
big business and the state."' 48 The paradigmatic French mechanism for
achieving industrial growth, therefore, consisted mainly in assembling an
elite corps of civil servants insulated from political pressures and sensitive
mainly to the desire of "industry to regulate competitive forces."' 44 This
forum for formulating French industrial policy would exclude "trade un-
137. Ken Ohmae, a leading Japanese executive has stated: "[Tihe Japanese government has
rarely been able to protect Japanese companies from other Japanese companies. And in almost every
industry where Japanese companies have done well in export markets, they have honed their teeth in
fierce domestic competition." Ohmae, supra note 118, at 20, col. 3.
138. One such French mercantilist was Colbert. For a discussion of Colbert's view of mercantil-
ism, see C. COLE, COLBERT AND A CENTURY OF FRENCH MERCANTILISM 335-55 (2d ed. 1964).
Adam Smith noted that "Mr. Colbert, the famous minister of Lewis XIV ...had unfortunately
embraced all the prejudices of the mercantile system. ... A. SMITH, supra note 13, at 627. Accord-
ing to Smith, Colbert favored urban industry at the expense of agricultural industry. Id. at 628.
139. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILIZATION OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH PLANNING: SOME LESSONS FOR
THE UNITED STATES 6 (Comm. Print 1977) (authored by S. Cohen) [hereinafter referred to as S.
COHEN].
140. Id.
141. Id. at 20.
142. Id. at 21.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at 6, 7, 21.
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ions, consumer groups, small business groups, peasant [agricultural] orga-
nizations and [even] Parliament,"' 46 although "places [could] be kept at
the conference tables for the 'responsible' trade unionists [that] the
planned industrial evolution [was] supposed to produce.'
146
At first, this approach to industrial policy was nothing more than ideol-
ogy and had little or no impact on French industry. The first four postwar
French "plans" were never taken seriously.14" However, like the other
West European economies, the French economy experienced rapid growth.
in the postwar period. 48 Many people associated the mythical indicative
planning policies with that growth.
The first real test of French planning came with the Fifth Plan, which
began in 1966. This Plan included a comprehensive program of "general
resource allocation," as well as an incomes policy for labor and a set of
targeted investments for business. " 9 The plan "failed dramatically"' 60
and was aborted in May 1968, midway through its scheduled duration.''
The Sixth Plan, begun in 1970, had the "same basic stfucture""' as its
immediate predecessor and quickly met the same fate. The French gov-
ernment killed off the "comprehensive planning" elements of both pro-
grams well before it issued the official obituaries.' The reason was sim-
ple: No group was willing to cooperate-to give up its quid pro
quo-"not business, not the middle classes, not the unions, and not the
Government."'"
Subsequent to the Sixth Plan, French efforts to spur industrial growth
and create a class of international champions have been limited to a case-
145. Id. at 7.
146. Id.
147. Herbert Stein, as research director for the Committee for Economic Development, was sent
to France by President Kennedy in 1962 to "investigate the possibility of improving the performance
of the American economy by emulating French planning." Stein recalls that:
Many people were infatuated with French planning at the time. The combination of intellec-
tual rigor, as suggested by the word "planning," and romance, as suggested by the word
"French," was extremely tempting. So a group of us went to Paris. We met with officials of
the Commissariat du Plan, with French businessmen, and with economists. By the time we
returned I had concluded, in a line that I could not get out of my mind: "Le Plan Francais, il
n'existe pas." The French government had forecasts about the economy, it made certain inter-
ventions in the economy-but it had no plan. It had no blueprint for the desired course of the
economy in specific and detailed terms and no machinery for bringing a blueprint into reality
if one had existed. The French "plan" was soon enough forgotten by everyone.
Stein, Don't Fall for Industrial Policy, FORTUNE, Nov. 14, 1983, at 64.
148. See J.-J. CARRE, P. DUBOIS & E. MALINVAUD, FRENCH ECONOMIC GROWTH 24-34 (1975).
149. S. COHEN, supra note 139, at 13-16.
150. Id. at 14.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 13-14.
153. Id. at 14.
154. Id. at 14-15.
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by-case approach.1"' As in Japan, however, such policies have not been
notably successful. The joint British and French Concorde, as well as the
French government's attempt to encourage the development of its domestic
computer industry, are illustrative examples.1 "
The attempts of other West European governments to guide and coordi-
nate the activities of specific industries have not met with any greater suc-
cess. The West Germans, like their French counterparts, had relied
mainly on market forces until the latter 1960's.'5' In the 1970's, however,
the West German government attempted to coordinate plans for its com-
puter and nuclear power industries; these efforts have not been success-
ful.1"8 In addition, West Germany's once-heralded industrial policy suc-
cesses in steel, coal mining, and shipbuilding have gone the way of their
Japanese counterparts.159 Overall, in the words of economist Michael
Wachter, the West European experience with indicative planning "has
just been terrible." '
Europe's comparatively poor economic performance over the past dec-
ade reinforces the suggestion that activist industrial planning policies were
not the key to European industrial growth. In general, as the West Euro-
pean economies came to rely more on centralized industrial policies in the
1970's, their economic performance declined both absolutely and relative
to the United States. 6 ' Since 1973, industrial growth has risen more rap-
155. Id. at 25.
156. See Kahn, The Relevance of Industrial Organization, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, ANTI.
TRUST, AND PUBLIC POLICY 16 U. Craven ed. 1983).
157. Schmidt, West Germany, Another Industrial Policy Victim, HERITAGE FOUND. INT'L BRIEF.
ING, Mar. 7, 1984, at I.
158. Id. at 4.
159. Id. 5-7.
160. BUS. WK., July 4, 1983, at 61.
161. Chart I shows the absolute and relative 1983 levels of GDP per capita among the major
industrial nations. It shows that the U.S. citizen still is substantially better off than citizens of any
other major industrialized nation: Chart I
GDP Per Capita of Leading
Industrial Nations,* 1983
Percent
Country GDP/Capita US level = 100
United States $13,106 100
Canada 12,104 92
Sweden 11,907 91
West Germany 10,691 82
France 9,961 76
Japan 8,966 68
United Kingdom 8,523 65
Italy 6,133 47
SOURCE: THE OECD OBSERVER, Mar. 1984, at 22-23.
'As defined in COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTIVITY POLICY:
KEY TO THE NATION'S ECONOMIC FUTURE (April 1983).
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idly in the United States than in any major industrialized West European
nation. Of course, other factors such as the OPEC oil embargo undoubt-
edly impeded European economic growth during this period; we do not
claim that increased reliance on planning and cooperation was necessarily
the major problem. Nonetheless, there is little or no empirical evidence
that industrial planning has led to significant economic growth in Western
Europe. Indeed, West European leaders now seem to be retreating from
the planning and cooperation model. As Bernard Attali, a socialist intel-
lectual and adviser to French President Mitterand, recently conceded:
It might be argued that the United States would fare considerably worse if, say, 1980 exchange
rates had been used to convert other nations' GDPs into U.S. dollars. However, the OECD ranking
remains unchanged when conversions are made on the basis of "purchasing power parities," as op-
posed to the limited items entering into foreign trade. (Sweden and Canada were not included in the
OECD study.) In the latter comparison, the U.S. level exceeds that of second-place Germany by
$2,226. This second method results in the same rankings for 1980, when the U.S. dollar was not as
valuable in foreign exchange. In that year, U.S. per capita GDP exceeded that of Germany by $1,936
in terms of "purchasing power parities." See OECD OBSERVER, Mar. 1982, at 31-32.
Consider as well the growth in industrial production from 1973 to 1983 for each of the eight
nations depicted in Chart II. The countries are listed in the same order as in Chart I: that is, accord-
ing to size of GDP per capita. The U.S. industrial growth rate is exceeded only by that of Japan. In
short, since the OPEC embargo in 1973, the U.S. industrial base, as measured by its index of indus-
trial output, has grown more rapidly than that of any of the major European nations.
Chart II
Percent Growth in Index of Industrial Production










SOURCE: Based on INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 37
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS (Sept. 1984); INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL STATISTICS, 1983 YEARBOOK.
The most telling indication of European economic performance is its failure to match the record of
the U.S. economy in generating more than 20 million new jobs in the 1970's. In that period total
employment in the European economy rose by approximately 3%, as opposed to a nearly 33% gain for
the U.S. economy. In addition, nine out of ten new entrants'were able to find jobs in the rapidly
expanding U.S. labor force of the 1970's; only three of ten new entrants could find jobs in the Euro-
pean labor force during the same period. See Ostry, The World Economy in 1983: Marking Time, 62
FOREIGN AFF. 537 n.6 (1984).
Even as the U.S. rate of unemployment fell from 9.7% in 1982 to 8.2% in 1983, European unem-
ployment rates were continuing their steady rise to 11%-more than three times their rate in 1973.
Approximately 18.5 million Europeans were out of work, of which an estimated 33% to 50% were
long-term, hard-core unemployed. Only 5% to 8% of the U.S. and Canadian labor force fell into that
category. Id. at 536. See also Whitman, Persistent Unemployment: Economic Policy Perspectives in
the United States and Western Europe, in UNEMPLOYMENT AND GROWTH IN THE WESTERN ECONO-
MIES 14 (A. Pierre, ed. 1984).
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We know perfectly well that the growth we want depends on the
entrepreneurial spirit. . . .Only entrepreneurs create jobs and new
opportunities. The world is changing and we are all entering an era
of profound decentralization and the entrepreneur. We are now in-
terested in helping people go out there and help themselves." 2
In summary, any argument that the U.S. government should rely more
on policies of planning and coordination cannot draw strong support from
the economic successes of Japan and the other Far Eastern free market
economies."' That argument, moreover, is substantially weakened by the
failure of West European experiments with indicative planning. Obvi-
ously, the U.S. government still should strive to promote economic devel-
opment through sound macroeconomic and microeconomic policies. The
government can play a useful role in reconciling seemingly contradictory
policies and regulations. Nevertheless, the United States should pursue
these objectives without relying upon the centralized industrial policies
that have been tried elsewhere. To quote U.S. venture capitalist Peter
Brooke: "It's incredible that some Americans are going to heavy state
planning when I'm being asked to go to Europe to help them disband
theirs. . . . We shouldn't follow their mistakes. Hell, we're the ones with
the answers."''
IV. Political Feasibility of a Centralized Industrial Policy
Even if centralized industrial policies such as those discussed in the pre-
vious section had helped other nations, it would not follow that the United
States ought to embrace such a policy. As the experience with the NRA
suggests, attempts to implement a workable centralized industrial policy
would affront some of the most ingrained characteristics of the American
political system.' 65 Moreover, "success" in overcoming the political obsta-
cles to effective economic planning might impose substantial costs upon
the nation's democratic processes and run counter to its tradition of indi-
vidual liberty.
A. Political Obstacles
Advocates of an activist American industrial policy quickly dismiss any
suggestion that their proposals would require a serious overhaul of Amer-
162. Wash. Post, Apr. 29, 1984, at B4, col. 5.
163. For an account of the successes of other Far Eastern market economies, see COMM. FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTIVITY POLICY: KEY TO THE NATION'S ECONOMIC FUTURE
95-106 (1983).
164. Wash. Post, Apr. 29, 1984, at B4, col. 5.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 74-114.
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ican government.' Many of them observe that the basic elements of such
a system are already buried in the interstices of tax codes and tariff poli-
cies, and scattered about in individual subsidy schemes and regulatory
measures. They believe that only a centralized decisionmaking structure
needs to be added to transform this existing patchwork into an effective
overall strategy.
167
This argument, however, ignores a major fact about the place of cen-
tralization in American government. Although unified efforts to achieve
clearly defined national goals are essential in times of war, centralized
peacetime policymaking is just what the American political system was
designed to prevent. Of course it is possible to overdo the argument for
"American exceptionalism, ' "' thereby exaggerating the distinctiveness of
American patterns. Political obstacles to effective government coordination
and guidance of industry plans may exist to some degree in all democratic
countries-as the Mitterand government in France has been discovering.
Nevertheless, the political and institutional obstacles to a coherent indus-
trial policy in this country are derived from some of the most pronounced
and deep-rooted features of the American political system. Together they
make it even less likely that the U.S. government could implement a suc-
cessful industrial policy based largely on central planning and tripartite
coordination.
Four related characteristics of the American political system would im-
pede the success of any such policy: the extraordinary range and diversity
of organized interest groups in the United States, the unusually accessible
character of American political institutions, the absence of a well- estab-
lished administrative elite, and the activist role of American courts.
1. Profusion of Interest Groups
The extraordinary profusion of interest groups in the United States is
not a recent development or a chance phenomenon, but reflects the unusu-
ally diverse backgrounds of the American population and the dynamic
character of American society. The proliferation of discrete interest groups
can be traced back to the writings of the Founders. The Federalist argued
that political debate could rarely be expected to rise above the clash of
selfish factions and praised the federal union precisely for embracing nu-
merous factions, thus diluting the strength of any particular interest: "Ex-
166. See, e.g., I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, supra note 6, at 379-80.
167. See, e.g., I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, supra note 6, at 235, 243-44; Do Modern Times Call
For an Industrial Policy?: A Conversation with Herbert Stein and Lester Thurow, supra note 6, at 6.
168. "American exceptionalism" is a term applied by some historians to the development of values
and institutions in the United States. See N. LEVIN, WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD POLITICS 3
(1968); L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
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tend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests;
you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a com-
mon motive to invade the rights of other citizens."1 9
In the 1830's, Alexis de Tocqueville marveled at the alacrity with
which Americans formed political associations to take up passing causes,
noting that "this powerful instrument of action has been applied to more
varied aims in America than anywhere else in the world."1 70 Foreign ob-
servers are still struck by the organizing energy of Americans. Most West-
ern countries, for example, have solicitations for several medical charities.
In the United States, however, fundraising campaigns exist for hundreds
of diseases, while some even have distinct lobbies for government
assistance.
As observers of regulatory policymaking in Washington will recognize,
this American passion for political organizing has serious ramifications for
industrial policy. Proponents of a "coordinated" industrial policy invaria-
bly stress the advantages of government-sponsored consensus between
"business" and "labor" 1 -as if these abstract entities could confer
around an intimate little table. In Western Europe, a few powerful union
leaders or trade association spokesmen might be accepted as authentic rep-
resentatives of vast industrial constituencies. In the United States, how-
ever, one who claims to speak for "business" or "labor" often finds intense
opposition from others in the same group who seek contrary objectives.
The Federal Trade Commission, for example, is often confronted with
pleas by one business organization, frequently supported by its employees,
challenging a merger or marketing policy of another. Small businesses,
which unlike their larger competitors frequently employ unorganized la-
bor, often oppose the positions of larger businesses in the same trade.
Within the same industry, businesses and their employees who stand to
gain from a particular government program are opposed by those busi-
nesses and workers who stand to lose from the program. Opposition also
can come from other industries that might be adversely affected.
In sum, the United States teems with entrepreneurial talent and ambi-
tion, both in politics and in business. This babble of competing voices
simply cannot be orchestrated into the kind of harmony required for a
coherent, consistent industrial policy. It is highly doubtful that Americans
would accept the degree of subordination to "larger" interests which
would be necessary to make such a policy successful.
169. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
170. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 174 (G. Lawrence trans. 1966).
171. See, e.g., R. REICH, supra note 6, at 276.
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2. Accessibility of Political Institutions
This fragmentation of interests is exacerbated by the second characteris-
tic of the American political system: the unusual accessibility of our gov-
erning institutions to factional pressures. State and local governments pro-
vide promotional platforms and mechanisms for obstruction that have few
counterparts in the centralized systems of Western Europe. 172 Local and
regional interests strain both major parties, neither of which has the ca-
pacity to impose much discipline, even within their congressional delega-
tions. 17  Power in Congress is diffused among numerous rival committees
and, in recent years, has been further diffused among even more numer-
ous subcommittees.'
74
Moreover, the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution en-
sures a continual tension between the executive and legislative branches, a
tension which produces additional accessibility. In contrast to the parlia-
mentary systems of Western Europe and Japan, the American system af-
fords little assurance that the legislative proposals of the Executive Branch
actually will be enacted and virtually guarantees that they will not be
enacted without considerable compromise and modification. 17 The system
also ensures that once a measure is enacted by Congress, its implementa-
tion by the executive will be subject to continuous pressures by an array of
oversight and appropriations committees, each with its own set of con-
cerns."' Within the Executive Branch itself, agencies with related respon-
sibilities are pulled in varying directions by their constituencies and their
champions and critics in Congress.1 7 The White House and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) find that "coordinating" policy among
different agencies is not always in their interest and is often beyond their
172. See D. HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON 1-45 (1974).
173. See Ranney, The Political Parties: Reform and Decline, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM 223-24 (A. King ed. 1978); Ranney, The President and His Party, in BOTH ENDS OF THE
AVENUE: THE PRESIDENCY, THE ExECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESS IN THE 1980S 131-53 (A. King
ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as BOTH ENDS OF THE AVENUE].
174. L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 111 (1979); Davidson,
Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making, in THE NEW CONGRESS 99-133 (T.
Mann & N. Ornstein eds. 1981).
175. See Ornstein, The Open Congress Meets the President, in BOTH ENDS OF THE AVENUE,
supra note 173, at'185-211; Jones, Presidential Negotiation with Congress, in BOTH ENDS OF THE
AVENUE, supra note 173, at 96-130.
176. See Schick, Politics Through Law: Congressional Limitations on Executive Discretion, in
BOTH ENDS OF THE AVENUE, supra note 173, at 154-84.
177. See Nadel, Making Regulatory Policy, in MAKING ECONOMIC POLICY IN CONGRESS 240-43
(A. Schick ed. 1983); see also R. NOLL & B. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION:
INTEREST GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 155-62 (1983).
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capacity.' 7 8 Merely establishing an interagency coordinating mechanism
can trigger crippling administrative jockeying and political dispute. 17 9
The significance of this political accessibility for any attempt to guide
and coordinate industry plans should be obvious to anyone who has fol-
lowed a few policy battles in Washington. Advocacy groups often make
their pitches to several different agencies and then appeal unfavorable re-
sponses to the White House or OMB, all the while attempting to secure
support in Congress. With so many points of entry into the policymaking
process, even a distinctly bad idea will keep bouncing back to life, and a
good idea will have a hard time preserving enough integrity to affect pol-
icy.' 80 The chaos in the federal budget process,' more than sixty years
after the institution of "centralized" budgeting controls in the Executive
Branch 182 and ten years after the institution of a "centralized" budget
committee in Congress,'88 provides sufficient testimony against the likeli-
hood that a coherent, coordinated industrial policy will emerge.
3. Absence of an Administrative Elite
Champions of a centralized policy frequently respond that past experi-
ence simply underscores America's need for a trusted, non-partisan coor-
dinating mechanism to guide national industrial policy. " This argument
fails, however, because of the third distinctive characteristic of the Ameri-
can political system: the absence of a well-established administrative elite.
One wonders where the impartial industrial policy directors would come
from in America and why anyone-especially Congress-would give them
sufficient trust and deference.
There are two related reasons for the absence of a prestigious corps of
American administrators. The first is the sweeping power of an American
178. See H. SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZA-
TION 200-31 (3d ed. 1980).
179. See Heclo, One Executive Branch or Many?, in BOTH ENDS OF THE AVENUE, supra note
173, at 26-58.
180. See, e.g., Miller, Shughart & Tollison, A Note on Centralized Regulatory Review, 43 PUB.
CHOICE 83 (1984) (decentralized administration will increase the ability of concentrated interests to
influence policy outcomes).
181. See generally THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS AFTER FIVE YEARS (R. Penner ed.
1981) (a collection of essays on the current state of the budget process); see also Schick, The Three
Ring Budget Process, in THE NEW CONGRESS, supra note 174, at 288-328.
182. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20; see also J. HICKS, supra note 55, at
51 (discussing the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921).
183. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat.
297 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.); see also Caiden, The Politics of
Subtraction, in MAKING ECONOMIC POLICY IN CONGRESS, supra note 177, at 100, 110-14; Schick,
The First Five Years of Congressional Budgeting, in THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS AFTER
FIVE YEARS, supra note 181, at 3, 4-7.
184. See, e.g., I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, supra note 6, at 377-78.
Yale Journal on Regulation
president over administrative appointments. American government agen-
cies have tremendous turnover in top personnel with each new adminis-
tration, especially compared with Western Europe. A new American pres-
ident controls several thousand immediate appointments, 8 " while only a
few dozen administrative posts change with the advent of a new cabinet in
West European countries. 8 ' This "revolving door" at high levels in the
bureaucracy virtually assures the existence of informed and experienced
figures outside the U.S. government at any given time. Critics of prevail-
ing or emerging policies in this country thus find it relatively easy to re-
cruit "expert witnesses" to bolster their critiques of government policies;
this tends to inhibit formation of the consensus among government admin-
istrators necessary for a successful coordinated policy.
The second reason for the absence of an administrative elite is the polit-
ical difficulty of detachment and neutrality in administrative decisionmak-
ing. Even the distinguished members of the Council of Economic Advisers
and the Federal Reserve Board rarely have been immune from criticism,
and still more rarely have they been free from powerful political pres-
sures. Top officials in Washington almost invariably earned their prestige
from past achievements in academe, business or politics, but rarely in ca-
reers devoted exclusively to administrative service. Their power typically
derives not from their personal reputations for wisdom and experience but
from their perceived support in the White House, Congress, or the press.
Proximity to these power centers often is enough in itself to provoke parti-
san suspicion.
Indeed, available evidence suggests that American bureaucrats are more
partisan than those in some other countries. For example, surveys of gov-
ernment administrators in Western Europe and the United States found
that the U.S. officials reflected a much wider range of ideological orienta-
tions. 87 The American bureaucrats met far more often with private inter-
est groups and had far more contact with legislators than did their Euro-
pean counterparts.' 88 Detached, neutral administration is not what the
American political system encourages, nor, by and large, what it
delivers.'89
185. See Nathan, The Reagan Presidency in Domestic Affairs, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY, AN
EARLY ASSESSMENT 48, 71-72 (F. Greenstein ed. 1983); H. HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS
36-41 (1977).
186. See B. PETERS, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 222-23
(1978).
187. J. ABERBACH, R. PUTNAM & B. ROCKMAN, BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS IN WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES 169 (1981).
188. Id. at 228-36.
189. Id.
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One cannot, moreover, comfortably assume that an American industrial
policy apparatus would somehow lend independent prestige to its political
chiefs. Joseph Schumpeter has observed: "A good bureaucracy is a slow
growth and cannot be created at will."'1 90 The prestigious and self-
confident bureaucracies in Western Europe and Japan became established
before the advent of full parliamentary politics."' In the United States, by
contrast, democratic politics appeared first. Politicians in the United States
thus do not stand in awe of the new bureaucracies they have created and
nurtured in recent decades.
Largely for want of a respected corps of impartial administrators,
therefore, administration of this nation's industrial policy likely would
face some of the same political problems encountered in existing pro-
grams. Politicians could not be expected to keep their hands off the new
industrial policy bureaucracy, given the vast economic stakes involved and
the enormous array of conveniently divisible decisions directly affecting so
many diverse constituencies. In this regard, the NRA experience discussed
earlier provides little reassurance. A more recent experience with coordi-
nated planning-defense procurement-also does not inspire confi-
dence.192 Although defense procurement is vital to the national interest
and has been entrusted largely to an elite group of military officials, deci-
sions on weapons systems and military supplies often are plainly and
powerfully influenced by the interests of particular congressmen in secur-
ing financial benefits for their home states or districts. 98 Such Congres-
sional involvement in the day-to-day implementation of industrial policy
would seriously jeopardize the independence and neutrality of the respon-
sible executive entity.
4. Activist Courts
The courts provide yet another source of fragmentation in the American
system and, hence, another potential impediment to the success of any
American industrial policy. Judges and lawyers play a far more active
role in government policymaking in the United States than in any other
country in the world. In part, this pattern reflects the fragmented and
190. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 390 n.14 (3d ed. 1975).
191. For a discussion of the emergence of bureaucracies in Western Europe, see A. DE TOC-
QUEVILLE, THE ANCIEN REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION 32-41 (S. Gilbert trans. 1955); F. HAYEK,
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 193-204 (1972); A. HEIDENHEIMER, THE GOVERNMENTS OF GER-
MANY 7, 68, 90-91 (1966). For a discussion of the origins of Japan's bureaucracy, see E. REISCHAUER
& J. FAIRBANK, EAST ASIA, THE GREAT TRADITION 611-13 (1960).
192. The B-1 bomber program is one recent experience which shows that considerations not lim-
ited to national security can affect the development of an arms system. See, e.g., U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, July 11, 1983, at 34-35.
193. J. FOX, ARMING AMERICA: HOW THE U.S. BUYS WEAPONS 83-84 (1974).
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highly competitive character of U.S. politics and the tenuous standing of
the administrative organs discussed above. These conditions encourage
losers of policy battles to seek another round of struggle in the courts, and
often prompt judges to cast a suspicious eye on the winners. The tradition
of the American judiciary as a constitutional champion of minorities also
encourages this enlarged role of courts and formal proceedings in Ameri-
can policymaking. The result is plain: To an extent unknown in Western
Europe or Japan, American administrators must specify precise stan-
dards, articulate their policy rationales, supply detailed evidence justifying
their decisions, and observe the elaborate niceties of correct procedure. 9 '
This system may give American lawyers and their clients more confidence
in the fairness of resulting adminstrative decisions. However, it does not
promote efficient or flexible, much less "coordinated," administrative
decisionmaking.
In short, the American system of government is itself responsible for a
number of market distortions that reduce industrial competitiveness and
retard economic growth. Efforts to "reform" that system through reliance
on comprehensive planning and cooperation, however, would probably fall
victim to the very forces that created those distortions. As the NRA and
West European programs of industrial planning have shown, such efforts
diminish industrial competitiveness and retard economic growth.
B. Implications for Democratic Institutions
Even if the political obstacles to an effective, centralized industrial pol-
icy could be overcome, however, the potential political and moral costs of
this achievement are sobering. These obstacles-and hence the costs of
overcoming them-are especially serious because centralized industrial
policy would have an extraordinarily broad scope. To overcome the politi-
cal obstacles, the government, at a minimum, would have to: (1) create a
broad-based, enduring perception of national peril, (2) delegate vast gov-
ernmental powers to groups of private firms or other special interests, and
(3) concentrate an extraordinary amount of power in a small group of
government officials. These actions might entail unacceptable costs to the
American political system.
The political and moral costs of a centralized industrial policy are di-
rectly related to the obstacles which it must surmount. To illustrate the
severity of these obstacles, it is useful to contrast industrial policy with
some recent issues addressed by presidential commissions. Bipartisan pres-
194. The requirements of correct administrative practice are set forth in the Adminstrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982). Judicial review of decisions reached by administrative agencies
is also provided. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
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idential commissions, established on various occasions to resolve vexing
political stalemates, can sometimes formulate widely accepted "package"
solutions. President Reagan's recent commission on the social security
financing crisis"' is an example. However, these commissions are most
successful in dealing with discrete, well-defined, and relatively short-term
controversies. Commissions that have taken on larger and more open-
ended policy controversies, such as the Kissinger Commission on Central
America,196 have had less success in forging political consensus.'9 Indus-
trial policy, by contrast, involves precisely such long-term, open-ended is-
sues. Hence the occasional special commission is not an appropriate model
for the political management of industrial policy. A longer-term model,
such as the planning experiences of the early New Deal,19 must be stud-
ied instead.
Judging from these precedents, the first requirement for a successful
industrial policy is a broad perception of national peril, a perception
which would inspire a patriotic spirit of self- sacrifice among diverse eco-
nomic interests. Even at the depths of the Great Depression, however,
such a spirit could not be maintained very long. This failure is one reason
why the NRA, after an enthusiastic reception, soon fell prey to bitter and
vehement attack.' 99 Perhaps only during the world wars was such a spirit
maintained for any considerable length of time. But even in wartime the
government reinforced the public's evident perception of external peril
with a continual blare of patriotic propaganda. The government would
have difficulty promoting such a self-sacrificing spirit in a prosperous
peacetime period, because critics of industrial policy could plausibly argue
that even the partial, short-term sacrifices imposed by such a policy were
not really necessary. Almost inevitably, the managers of industrial policy
would require a continuous din of supporting propaganda sufficient to
intimidate the critics and silence the skeptics.
The second political requisite of successful industrial policy is a sub-
195. The National Commission on Social Security Reform was established by President Reagan
on December 16, 1981. Exec. Order No. 12,335, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,633.
196. The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America was established by President Rea-
gan on July 19, 1983. Exec. Order No. 12,433, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,227.
197. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1984, at A20, col. 1.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 199 to 206.
199. See E. HAWLEY, supra note 73, at 135-36. Hawley wrote:
Initially the NRA had appealed to a variety of conflicting economic and ideological groups,
each bent upon implementing its own theory of recovery and its own vision of the good society.
... Success in achieving all [of the groups'] goals was impossible; but in the beginning, the
conflicts could be and were glossed over by a high-pressure propaganda campaign. The diffi-
culty came when the propaganda wore off, the sense of impending national disaster passed,
and the great cooperative effort disintegrated into the original welter of conflicting and quar-
reling groups.
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stantial delegation of governmental power to well-established groups of
private firms or special interests. The NRA codes, for example, although
presented as the product of broad-based consultation, actually were
promulgated by the established firms and labor organizations in each in-
dustry. 00 The industry codes, whose promulgation the larger firms typi-
cally controlled, tended to discriminate against smaller businesses.20 1 The
codes "retarded recovery, injured the wage earner, and interfered with
President Roosevelt's efforts to eliminate unemployment. 2 2 They also
hampered competition. 03
These effects were not the result of corruption, but an inevitable conse-
quence of the need to secure quick agreements. The easiest means of
achieving agreement was to accommodate those with the most economic
and political power. During World War I, under more exigent circum-
stances, the government proceded in similar ways. ' Price levels, wage
rates and cost-plus contract terms were set in agreement with established
firms and labor organizations. 06
The final requisite of a successful industrial policy is an extraordinary
concentration of power in the hands of a small group of government ad-
ministrators. Such concentration is the only way of maintaining coherence
and continuity in a policy that must adapt to many changing particulars.
The NRA was administered precisely with such extraordinary and open-
ended power, allocated to a central administrative organization without
any real guidance from Congress or any real possibility of control by the
courts. Justice Cardozo characterized such a system as "delegation run
riot" in the Supreme Court decision striking down the NRA.2 "
Even if these three conditions were satisfied, industrial policy would
have a dubious chance of success. It is equally doubtful, moreover, that
many Americans concerned about traditional democratic values would
wish to see the policy succeed on such terms. Thomas Jefferson provided
an emphatic warning about the threat of centralized government to indi-
vidual liberty:
200. C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 68 ("[Ulnder the NRA, ... labor and industry jousted with
each other to divide the spoils-the consumer's purchasing power."). See supra text accompanying
notes 89-91.
201. L. LYON, supra note 76, at 745; B. BELLUSH, supra note 74, at 140, 149.
202. B. BELLUSH, supra note 74, at 144, 166; C. ROOS, supra note 69, at 149-51, 472. See gener-
ally, supra note 103, on the ill effects of the NRA.
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No, my friend, the way to have good and safe government, is not to
trust it all to one, but to divide it among the many, distributing to
every one exactly the function he is competent to .... It is by divid-
ing and subdividing [the powers of government] from the great na-
tional one down through all its subordinations, until it ends in the
administration of every man's farm by himself; by placing under
every one what his own eye may superintend, that all will be done
for the best. What has destroyed liberty and the rights of man in
every government which has ever existed under the sun? The gener-
alizing and concentrating all cares and powers into one body .... 207
Conclusion
Efforts to strengthen the U.S. economy by creating a central adminis-
trative body to plan and coordinate a national industrial policy promise to
be either ineffective or a cure worse than the perceived disease. Such an
approach likely would make U.S. industry less competitive both at home
and abroad; it would reduce the nation's standard of living. Even if the
centralized approach did foster economic growth in other nations, more-
over, it could not succeed in the American political system. The profusion
of interest groups, the accessibility of the legislative and executive
branches, the lack of an adminstrative elite, and the activist role of the
judicial system in this country would thwart any comprehensive program
of coordinated strategic planning. Moreover, any attempt to transplant
such an industrial policy to American soil might impose unacceptable
costs upon the nation's democratic processes. If the United States is to
continue its long-term economic growth while preserving its democratic
values, it must look to the principles of economic and political liberalism
which the Founders embraced and which have made their American ex-
periment the most successful economic system in history.
207. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), reprinted in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 660-61 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944). The
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The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to
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assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no
council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a
man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.
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